Topic:On the Optimal Disclosure of Queue Length Information
Time: 16:30, May 19th(Friday), 2017
Venue: C407, Building of Economics and Management, West Campus
Lecturer: Jinting Wang
About the Lecturer: Jinting Wang, a professor, doctoral dissertation supervisor, Party Secretary, Deputy Head of the Department of Mathematics at the School of Science, Beijing Jiaotong University, is a winner of New Century Excellent Talents Program by the Ministry of Education. He got his Bachelor’sdegree from the Department of Mathematics, Hebei Normal University in 1994, his Master’s degree from the Department of Applied Mathematics and Physics, Hebei University of Technology in 1997, and his Doctorate from the Institute of Applied Mathematics, Chinese Academy of Sciences in 2000.Engaged in the research ofapplied probability and statistics, and stochastic operations, he is now a council member of ORSC (Operations Research Society of China), Director of Reliability Group of ORSC, Deputy Director of Stochastic Service and Operational Management of ORSC, and Deputy Director of Beijing OperationsResearch Society. He won the 10th National Young Teachers Prize supported by Fok Ying Tong Education Foundation in 2006, and was selected into the New Century Excellent Talents Program by the Ministry of Education in 2011. He is the deputy Editor-in-chief of International Journal of Operations Research, editorial board member of Application of Statistics and Management and Journal of System Science and MathematicalSciences. He was in charge of 6 projects supported by Natural Science Foundation of China and 3 provincial-ministerial projects. Besides, he has published more than 100 papers, more than 60 of which are indexed by SCI and cited more than 400 times. Strict others citationis 280 times.
About the lecture:Simhonet al. (2016, ORL) proved that, disclosing the queue length to customers when the queue is shorter than some threshold and concealing the information otherwise, never maximizes throughout in M/M/1 queues - when customers are aware of the policy and the threshold. We show that it is indeed optimal when customers do not have the information of the policy. Furthermore, we prove that the socially optimal disclosure policy under this setting contains a“hole”,i.e., it is to disclose the queue length to the customers when the queue is sufficiently short or sufficiently long but not disclose when the queue length is moderate.
All the Teachers and Students are welcome!
School of Economics and Management
May 19th, 2017
